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WHO IS IN CHARGE, AND WHO SHOULD BE?
THE DISCIPLINARY ROLE OF THE
COMMANDER IN MILITARY JUSTICE
SYSTEMS
LINDSY NICOLE ALLEMAN*
“Discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures success to the weak, and esteem to all . . . .” 1

INTRODUCTION
Take a drive down the highway or a look into any parking lot
and you will notice a plethora of yellow magnetic “Support Our
Troops” ribbons decorating the backs of many cars. It is impossible
to escape the fact that the American public has great support for, and
interest in, the military. September 11 th, the war in Iraq, and the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina keep the military as a pe rpetual topic in
the news and in the minds of Americans. One aspect of the military
seems to be particularly intriguing to Americans—military justice.
The number of news stories focusing on issues of military justice—
ranging from the investigation of the prisoner abuse scandal at Abu
Ghraib, to the legal challenges made on behalf of the Guantanamo
Bay detainees, and the court-martial of Sgt. Hasan Akbar at Fort
Bragg—serve to illustrate the popularity and intrigue of the issue.
Fictionalization of military justice in TV shows such as E-Ring and
JAG or in movies like A Few Good Men also attracts broad audiences
and, in doing so, provides the public with insight into the military justice process in action. While neither the news stories nor the dramatic cinematic portrayals of the military justice system may be com-
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1. General George Washington, Instructions to Company Captains (July 29, 1757) in 4
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, Nov. 1756—Oct. 1757 341, 344 (W.W. Abbot
& Dorothy Twohig eds., 1984).
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pletely accurate, they do keep the topic in the forefront of the American public’s interest.
Not only is the American public paying attention to issues of
military justice, but, in light of the 50 th anniversary of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in 2001 and reforms taking place in
other countries, an academic debate over the military justice system
in the United States has evolved, triggering calls for reform from one
side and fierce voicing of support from the other.2 In particular, the
debate has focused on the role of the commander in the military justice system. This Note will explore the dominant role of the U.S. military commander within the military justice system in comparison to
the far smaller role of the Canadian military commander and the almost nonexistent role of the Israeli military commander. Canada and
Israel were chosen for this comparative analysis because of their
unique stances regarding the role of their commanders in military justice and because both countries were noted in the Cox Commission
Report3 for their reform efforts.
I. THE DISCIPLINARY ROLE OF THE MILITARY
COMMANDER IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States military justice system, the commander
plays a dominant role. The commander, often called “the convening
authority” in light of his ability to convene court-martial proceedings,
is given great latitude in dealing with disciplinary matters.4 “A military convening authority is singularly powerful with respect to his influence over the military justice system. He has no civilian equiv alent. He is not a lawyer and generally has no formal legal training.”5
His authority and discretion to make disciplinary decisions regarding
the soldiers serving beneath him, however, stem from the convening
authority’s leadership position. 6 The convening authority is a senior

2. See James F. Garrett, Recent Developments in Unlawful Command Influence, 2004
ARMY LAW. 2, 6 (2004) (outlining the debate over public perception of the military justice system).
3. See infra notes 26-46.
4. James B. Roan & Cynthia Buxton, The American Military Justice System in the New
Millennium, 52 A.F. L. R EV. 185, 192 (2002).
5. Meredith L. Robinson, Volunteers for the Death Penalty? The Application of Solorio v.
United States to Military Capital Litigation, 6 GEO. MASON L. R EV. 1049, 1058 (1998).
6. OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, MILITARY JUSTICE AT THE SUMMARY
TRIAL LEVEL 1-13 (2001), available at
http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/training/publications/POCT_docs/military_justice_manual_e.pdf
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commanding officer, often a colonel or general.7 The commander has
the power to do the following: conduct direct investigations,8 authorize probable cause searches,9 refer charges to court-martial,10 convene
courts-martial,11 grant witnesses immunity,12 negotiate and approve
pretrial agreements,13 make capital referrals to courts-martial,14 select
courts-martial panel members,15 grant funding to government and defense counsel for employment of expert witnesses,16 approve sentences,17 and grant cle mency.18 The U.S. commander plays a dominant role in all aspects of the disciplinary system and “has near
absolute discretion at every stage of a military justice proceeding.”19
By establishing such a dominant role for the convening authority,
the military justice system presents the potential problem of a commander using his power and influence in such a way as to thwart the
fairness, impa rtiality, and integrity of disciplinary proceedings. Such
negative use of power has been termed “unlawful command influence.”20 The general concern regarding unlawful command influence
is that the commander has the ability to influence judicial proceedings
and participants in such a way as to deprive the accused of his right to
a fair trial.21 As stated bluntly by Chief Judge of the Court of Military
Appeals (now renamed U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces), Robinson O. Everett, “[c]ommand influence is the mortal

(Can.) (“The ability to command respect and to effectively control subordinates is based to a
large part on the leadership ability of the officer.”).
7. Roan, supra note 4, at 196.
8. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 303 (2005) [hereinafter
MCM].
9. Id., Mil. R. Evid. 315(d).
10. Id. R.C.M. 407(a).
11. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE arts. 22-24 (2005) [hereinafter UCMJ].
12. MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 704(c).
13. Id. R.C.M. 705.
14. Id. R.C.M. 601.
15. Id. R.C.M. 502(a)(1).
16. Id. R.C.M. 703(d).
17. Id. R.C.M. 1107. The commander does not, however, have the power to change a finding of not guilty or to increase a sentence. Id.
18. Id. R.C.M. 1107(d)(1).
19. Robinson, supra note 5, at 1061.
20. Unlawful command influence has been defined as “the improper interference by a superior in command with the independent judgment of a person responsible for judicial decision.” CHARLES A. SHANOR & L. LYNN HOGUE, MILITARY LAW IN AN UTSHELL 117 (1996).
21. Jack L. Rives & Steven J. Ehlenbeck, Civilian Versus Military Justice in the United
States: A Comparative Analysis, 52 A.F. L. R EV. 213, 226 (2002).
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enemy of military justice.”22 For this reason, even the perception of
unlawful command influence is considered problema tic.23 Thus, the
UCMJ endeavors to remove actual instances of unlawful command
influence and minimize any appearance of it by forbidding commanders from attempting to influence judicial proceedings.24 Under Article 98, disciplinary action can be taken against those who obstruct
courts-martial proceedings.25 Nonetheless, the central role of the
commander makes the potential for unlawful command influence a
constant concern.
In 2001, in recognition of the 50 th anniversary of the UCMJ, the
National Institute of Military Justice, a private, non-profit organiz ation focusing on fairness in the military, sponsored a commission to
review the military justice system.26 Named for its chair, the Honorable Walter T. Cox III, a former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces, the Cox Commission solicited comments and held a public hearing in order to develop recommendations for improvements to the UCMJ.27 The commission members
also took this as a chance to learn from the experiences of other countries in the administration of military justice. The Cox Commission
specifically noted that “[i]n recent years, countries around the world
have modernized their military justice systems, moving well beyond
the framework created by the UCMJ fifty years ago. In contrast, military justice in the United States has stagnated, remaining insulated
from external review and largely unchanged despite dramatic shifts in
armed forces demographics, military missions, and disciplinary strategies.”28 The Cox Commission noted the influence of reform efforts in

22. United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986).
23. See James Kevin Lov ejoy, Watchdog or Pitbull?: Recent Developments in Judicial Review of Unlawful Command Influence, 1999 ARMY LAW 25, 27 (1999).
24. UCMJ art. 37 (2005). See also MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 104(a)(1) (“No convening
authority or commander may censure, reprimand, or admonish a court-martial or other military
tribunal or any member, military judge, or counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the court -martial or tribunal, or with respect to any other exercise of the
functions or the court-martial or tribunal or such persons in the conduct of the proceedings.”).
25. UCMJ, art. 98 (2005).
26. The Honorable Walter T. Cox, III, Chair, Report of the Commission on the 50th Anniversary of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2001 NAT’L INST. OF MIL. JUST. 1. [hereinafter
“Cox Commission Report”].
27. Id. at 3 -4 (“More than 250 individuals, representing themselves and more than a dozen
organizations, submitted written comments to the Commission. Nineteen testified in person.
This Report, [is] intended for submission to the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services, the Secretary of Defense, the Service Se cretaries, and the Code Committee . . . .”).
28. Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
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several foreign jurisdictions, including Canada and Israel.29 After its
review of concerns and potential solutions, the commission produced
what is commonly referred to as the Cox Commission Report and
made four recommendations regarding the practice and procedures of
courts-martial.30 Two of those recommendations relate specifically to
the dominant role of the U.S. military commander:
1. Modify the pretrial role of the convening authority in both selecting court-martial members and making other pre-trial legal decisions that best rest within the purview of a sitting military judge.
2. Increase the independence, availability, and responsibility of
military judges.31

The Commission noted that command involvement is essentia l to the
disciplinary system in the military, but should not go so far as to
weaken the due process rights of service members.32
In the opinion of the Cox Commission, convening authorities
cast undeniable shadows of unfairness over courts-martial due to the
commanders’ ability to control the possible outcomes of trials.33 The
Cox Commission noted that “[t]he combined power of the convening
authority to determine which charges shall be preferred, the level of
court-martial, and the venue where the charges will be tried, coupled
with the idea that this same convening authority selects the members
of the court-martial to try the cases, is unacceptable in a society that
deems due process of law to be the bulwark of a fair justice system.”34
The dominant role of commanding officers was considered the most
problematic issue in the military justice system because it permits actual unlawful command influence as well as the appearance of such.35
The Cox Commission Report stresses that, in order to remedy
this problem, the most immediate change necessary is to remove the
selection of panel members from the control of convening authorities.36 By requiring the convening authority to select panel members
and charging that same authority with the investigation and prosecu29. Id. at 3 n.4 (noting reforms in the U.K. Australia, India, Ireland, Mexico, and South
Africa, in addition to those in Canada and Israel).
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id.
32. Cox Commission Report, supra note 26, at 6.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 8.
35. See id. at 6 -7 (“The far-reaching role of commanding officers in the court -martial process remains the greatest barrier to operating a fair system of criminal justice within the armed
forces.”).
36. Id. at 7.
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tion of the defendant, the present system unnecessarily risks the appearance of improper command influence.37 To address this problem,
the Cox Commission recommended that Article 25 of the UCMJ be
amended to require the convening authority to prepare a list of eligible service members and then randomly select individuals from that
list in order to build the slate of panel members.38
The Cox Commission also notes its concern over the convening
authorities’ vast power over pretrial decisions, stating that “the perception that the convening authority can manipulate the pretrial
process to the advantage of either side . . . mandates [a] change in authority [of commanders] over pretrial legal matters.”39 Pretrial decisions, from approving travel of witnesses to the control over the investigation of crimes,40 necessarily involve issues of due process and
equal protection. The Cox Commission further hones in on the point
that, while the ability to make pretrial decisions can actually affect the
outcome of the trial, even the mere appearance of a convening authority manipulating the process is sufficient to warrant a change.41
Since pretrial decisions involve legal questions, the Cox Commission
noted that these decisions are more appropriately made by a military
judge.42 Furthermore, in reference to judges, the Cox Commission
Report advocated not only that their roles in the pretrial decisions be
strengthened, but also that they be granted increased judicial independence from the convening authority.43 The Cox Commission advised that in order to decrease the perception of the commander exercising unlawful command influence over judges, standing judicial
circuits should be created and judges should be given tenure.44
In summary, the Cox Commission’s main recommendations with
regard to fairness and the perception of fairness in the United States
military justice system include limiting the dominant role of the commander in selecting panel members and making pretrial decisions, as
well as increasing the independence of judges. As the Cox Commission noted, other countries have instituted reforms to deal with the

37. Id.
38. Cox Commission Report, supra note 26, at 7.
39. Id. at 8.
40. See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text (discussing the powers of the convening
authority in the disciplinary process).
41. Cox Commission Report, supra note 26, at 8.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 8-9.
44. Id.
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problem of command influence in their military justice systems.45 The
approaches taken by Canada and Israel are particularly illustrative of
the different methods by which a country can attempt to guarantee
fairness within the military justice system.
II. THE DISCIPLINARY ROLE OF THE MILITARY
COMMANDER IN CANADA
The military justice system used by the Canadian Forces was
once very similar to that of the United States, since both systems were
originally based on the English form of military justice under the British Articles of War.46 Canada, however, has subsequently moved beyond the United States by greatly reducing the role of commanders in
its military disciplinary system.47 The statutory basis for the Canadian
military justice system is the Code of Service Discipline, embodied in
the National Defense Act, Part III.48 Further provisions can also be
found in the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian
Forces, enacted by the Canadian Cabinet and Minister of National
Defense.49 Major changes to the Canadian military justice system
have taken place in the last 25 years as a result of legal changes, court
challenges, and public opinion.
In 1982, Canada significantly cha nged its domestic law by adopting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.50 The Charter established the rights that every Canadian citizen has, even those in the
military, unless exceptions can be justified.51 Some rights guaranteed
by the Charter, however, may be more limited in the context of military service: for example, the Charter specifies that offenses under
military law are to be tried by military tribunal.52 The adoption of the
45. Id. at 3 n.4. See also supra note 29.
46. Christopher W. Behan, Don’t Tug on Superman’s Cape: In Defense of Convening Authority Selection and Appointment of Court-Martial Panel Members, 176 MIL. L. R EV. 190, 193,
266 (2003).
47. See id. at 193-94.
48. Jerry S.T. Pitzul & John C. Maguire, A Perspective on Canada’s Code of Service Discipline, 52 A.F. L. R EV. 1, 1 (2002).
49. Id.
50. Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 (being sched. B to
the Canada Act 1982, c. 11 (U.K.)).
51. Telephone Interview with Ken Watkin, Deputy Judge Advocate General for the Canadian International Forces in Durham, North Carolina (Apr. 19, 2005).
52. MILITARY JUSTICE AT THE SUMMARY TRIAL LEVEL, supra note 6, at 1 -3, 1-4, 1-6. Article 11(d) of the Charter guarantees that a person charged with an offense has the right “to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.” Charter of Rights and Freedoms, art. 11(d).
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Charter forced the Canadian Forces to “reconcile its military justice
provisions and processes with the constitutional protections embodied in the Charter.”53 Incremental changes in the military justice system resulted from this de facto merger between certain aspects of the
military and civilian criminal legal processes.54
Encouraged by the adoption of the Charter, legal challenges to
the independence of the military court arose. The most significant of
these cases is R. v. Généreux, argued before the Canadian Supreme
Court in 1992.55 In Généreux, a corporal appealed his general courtmartial conviction for drug trafficking and desertion, arguing that the
court-martial did not constitute an independent and impartial tribunal
under the Charter’s Article 11(d).56 The Court held that military
commanders should not be able to interfere in matters directly and
immediately relevant to the judicial process.57 The court analyzed the
differences between true independence and perceived independence,
concluding that actual lack of judicial independence did not need to
be established for a successful challenge.58 Moreover, the Court
noted that “irrespective of any actual bias on the part of the tribunal,
[the law] seeks to maintain the integrity of the judicial system by preventing any reasonable apprehensions of such bias.”59 The Court
used an objective standard, asking whether an informed, reasonable
person would perceive the military court as being independent.60 In
the Court’s opinion, the dominant role of the commander cast serious
doubts on the institutional independence of military justice proceedings.61 In particular, judges in the court-martial system lacked the
safety of tenure, financial security, and institutional independence.62
Regarding tenure, the Court noted that judges should only be removable for cause. The Court also voiced concern that making the commanding officer responsible for a judge’s fitness reports was inappropriate because doing so gave the commanding officer the power to
jeopardize a judge’s career by issuing negative reports.63 The Cana53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Pitzul, supra note 48, at 8.
Watkin Interview, supra note 51.
R. v. Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 308-10.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 286 -87
R. v. Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 308-09.
Id. at 302-03, 307-10.
Id. at 305.
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dian Supreme Court held that military tribunals were not independent and impartial and thus violated the Canadian Cha rter of Rights
and Freedoms.64
Following the decision in Généreux, public interest and inquiry
into the Canadian military justice system was further heightened in
1993 after Canadian Forces committed human rights violations while
involved in peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Bosnia.65 There
was great public outcry against how the punishment of the offenders
was handled, resulting in the creation of a governmental Commission
of Inquiry to investigate allegations that the commanders’ involv ement in the military justice system was inappropriate.66 The Commission took a broad approach and examined both civilian and military
expectations of the military justice system.67
As a result of the adoption of the Charter, court challenges, and
the increase in public scrutiny due to the incidents in Somalia and
Bosnia, Canada implemented a number of legislative changes to adjust the Canadian Forces’ military justice system.68 Important
changes, which increased courts-martial independence include:
• “[S]eparating the functions of convening courtsmartial and appointing judges and panel members;
• [A]dopting a random methodology for selecting
courts-martial panel members; and
• [I]mplementing reforms to ensure the protection of
tenure, financial security and institutional independence of military judges, including appointing
judges for fixed terms, adopting the civilian ‘causebased’ removal standard and discontinuing the use
of career evaluations as a measure of judicial performance.”69
Furthermore, the prosecutorial function was removed from the commander’s control and assigned to the Director of Military Prosecutions, and the appointment of panel members was centralized under
the Chief Military Trial Judge.70 These changes have minimized the
role of the Canadian commander in the military justice system so that
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 314.
Pitzul, supra note 48, at 11.
Id.
Watkin Interview, supra note 51.
Behan, supra note 46, at 267.
Pitzul, supra note 48, at 8.
Behan, supra note 46, at 267-68.
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he now exerts less influence in military justice proceedings than his
U.S. counterpart.
III. THE DISCIPLINARY ROLE OF THE MILITARY
COMMANDER IN ISRAEL
Israel has taken a more extreme approach than Canada to limit
the risk of undue command influence in their military justice system.
The Israel Defense Forces are governed by the Military Justice Law
(MJL) enacted in 1955.71 Under the MJL, legal powers “are granted
to the Military Advocate General, which is a professional body made
up of lawyers who operate independently and free from external influences.”72 The Military Advocate General (MAG) is responsible
for several key functions of the military justice system, including the
filing of the charge sheet,73 arraignment,74 ordering a preliminary investigation by an investigating judge,75 and supervision of disciplinary
proceedings before a commander.76 In addition, the MAG can overturn or adjust an unlawful sentence imposed by a commander.77 This
last power, the ability to interfere in the judicial activity of a commanding officer who may outrank the MAG, is unique to the Israeli
military justice system78 and ensures that sentences are reviewed by a
legally trained member of the military.79
Although the MAG has broad military justice powers in the Israel Defense Forces, commanders also retain some limited control.
The Israeli equivalent of the American convening authority is the
District Chief.80 The District Chief can order the Chief Military

71. Military Justice Law, 5715-1955, 9 LSI 195, (1954-55) (Isr.).
72. Menachem Finkelstein & Yifat Tomer, The Israeli Military Legal System—Overview of
the Current Situation and a Glimpse into the Future, 52 A.F. L. R EV. 137, 144 (2002).
73. Military Justice Law §§ 280-82.
74. Id.
75. Id. § 178(4).
76. Id. §§ 136-76.
77. Id. § 168(4).
78. Finkelstein & Tomer, supra note 72, at 144.
79. Telephone Interview with Lt. Col. Amos N. Guiora, former Military Advocate General
with the Israel Defense Forces and current Professor of Law at Case School of Law in Durham,
North Carolina (Apr. 18, 2005). “[T]he MAG is gene rally subordinate to military orders but at
the same time has a separate, independent obligation to fulfill the roles prescribed by law.”
Finkelstein & Tomer, supra note 72, at 140 n.12. Furthermore, in a MAG’s chain of command,
his superior is not the District Chief, but is also a MAG who is at least a two star general.
Guiora Interview, supra .
80. Guiora Interview, supra note 79.
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Prosecutor to file an appeal,81 he can order, with consent of the MAG,
the quashing of a charge sheet,82 and he can confirm a judgment or
mitigate an imposed sentence.83 The Israeli Supreme Court, however,
has taken the position that the ability of District Chiefs to intervene
in judicial proceedings, even in this limited fashion, undermines the
independence of the military justice system.84 Thus, the Supreme
Court has “tended to give a narrow interpretation to the scope and
substance of the powers vested in District Chiefs.”85
For instance, in what was termed the “Duvedan” case, four
commanders charged with the negligent death of a civilian at a
checkpoint filed an application first with the MAG and then with the
District Chief to quash the charges against them.86 The MAG dismissed the application. The District Chief stated that had the MAG
not already dismissed the application, he would have ordered the
charges quashed, but because the District Chief’s power to quash
charges requires the consent of the MAG, he lacked the authority to
do so when the MAG had already dismissed the application.87 In response to this problem of parallel powers, the Supreme Court limited
the power of District Chief saying, “we ought not to presume that a
military commander may make a decision that contradicts that of the
Military Advocate General.”88
In Chief Military Prosecutor v. Aflaloi,89 which focused on the
District Chief’s power to order a Chief Military Prosecutor to file an
appeal, the Supreme Court further limited the District Chief’s discretion. It noted that because District Chiefs are not always legally
trained or familiar with legal issues and judicial proceedings, the
power to make decisions of a legal and judicial nature should be directed away from them and decisive weight should be given to the
opinion of the Chief Military Prosecutor. The Court found that a
District Chief’s choice not to follow the opinion of the Chief Military

81. Military Justice Law § 424.
82. Id. § 308.
83. Id. §§ 441-42.
84. See Finkelstein & Tomer, supra note 72, at 146.
85. Id.
86. HCJ 2702/97, Anon. v. Minister of Defense, 53(4) P.D. 97, cited in Finkelstein &
Tomer, supra note 72, at 146 & n.40.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Cr.A. 44/97, Chief Military Prosecutor v. Aflalo, cited in Finkelstein & Tomer, supra
note 72, at 147 n.40.
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Prosecutor might constitute grounds for finding an extreme lack of
reasonableness, thereby voiding the District Chief’s decision.90
Military judges in Israel also enjoy independence from commanding officers much in the same way that the MAG does. Under
the Israeli military justice system, judicial panels are comprised of
three judges—one of whom is always a legally qualified judge, while
the other two can be military judges without formal legal training.91
Although the military judges are sometimes perceived to be less independent because they are part of the military system and thus considered subject to institutional bias, the presence of legally qualified
judges helps to negate this perception.92 Furthermore, judges must
answer only to the dictates of the law when rendering decisions—not
their commanders.93
Finally, the Israel Defense Forces have eschewed the U.S. model
for selecting panel members and have adopted the model used by
Canada—the random selection process.94 This process ensures that
the panels are gua ranteed to be independent.95 There have been no
credible allegations of unlawful command influence regarding panel
selection as the system simply does not allow for that as a possibility.96
Thus, between the random selection of panel members, the statutory
independence of judges and MAGs, and the great limitations placed
on the already minimal disciplinary powers of the District Chiefs, the
issue of unlawful command influence is moot in the Israeli military
justice system.
IV. CHANGES TO THE U.S. MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM
There are many who are skeptical of the need to reduce the role
of the commander in the U.S. military justice system, despite the success of such reforms in foreign jurisdictions. Likewise, there are
many who think the methods used in Canada and Israel, including
random selection of panel members or increased judicial independence, would not be transferable to the American system. Moreover,
some critics are opposed to making changes based on adjustments
made in other countries. They believe that the “just because they did
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Military Justice Law § 202.
Finkelstein & Tomer, supra note 72, at 153.
Military Justice Law § 184.
Guiora Interview, supra note 79.
Id.
Id.
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it” attitude is not a good argument for why the United States should
change. These critics point out that the contextual and structural
frameworks of Canada and Israel are not germane or applicable to
the United States.97
A. Random Selection of Panel Members
The random selection of military panel members has been viciously attacked as unnecessary in the United States because some
believe that the current system does not lead to biased panel me mbers. Currently, the convening authority chooses panel members
based on who is “best qualified” by considering a candidate’s “age,
education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament.” 98 To mitigate any potential unlawful command influence,
which has been placed upon the panel up to this point, both the government and defense counsel have one preemptory challenge.99 A
judge also has the power to grant additional preemptory challenges100
and may, himself, remove a panel member.101 Furthermore, during
discovery the defense receives documentation of the convening authority’s nomination and selection process of panel members.102 The
defense counsel may also interview those involved in the selection
process, including the convening authority himself and his Staff Judge
Advocate.103 Then, if the defense believes that unlawful command influence has taken place, she can raise a motion at trial.104 The defense
counsel may also question panel members specifically about unlawful
command influence during trial and request removal if she finds a
lack of impartiality or fairness.105 Moreover, the judge has an independent duty to question panel members on whether they were sub-

97. See Behan, supra note 46, at 263; see also Theodore Essex & Leslea Tate Pickle, A Reply to the Report of the Commission on the 50th Anniversary of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (May 2001): “The Cox Commission,” 52 A.F. L. R EV. 233, 236 (2002) (“[T]he legal issues
decided [in Canada] were quite different than any that could be raised with regard to the
UCMJ.”).
98. UCMJ art. 25(d)(2); MCM., supra note 8, R.C.M. 502(a)(1).
99. UCMJ, art. 41; MCM., supra note 8, R.C.M. 912(g).
100. United States v. Carter, 25 M.J. 471, 476 (C.M.A. 1988).
101. MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 912(f).
102. MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 701(a)(1).
103. Essex, supra note 97, at 244.
104. Id.
105. UCMJ art. 41 (2005).
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ject to command influence.106 If a judge denies removal for cause,
that ruling is subject to appeal.107 Finally, opportunities for unlawful
command influence over a panel are further limited by the Article 37
requirement that performance evaluations may not take into account
how soldiers performed their duties as court-martial panel me mbers.108 “Thus the system is designed to ensure court members exercise their independent judgment in evaluating the evidence in the
case.”109
Since the U.S. military justice system has many safeguards to
protect the impartiality of panel members, critics of change argue that
there is no reason to adjust the system. Moreover, they observe that
the random sele ction method used in both the Canadian and Israeli
militaries has its own set of problems. Most importantly, as evidenced by the Canadian and Israeli systems, the implementation mechanics and cost increase exponentially by taking the selection power
away from the commander.110 For example, initial problems with the
random selection model in Canada included a computer assigning a
military attaché in Malaysia to be the president of a court-martial proceeding being held in Eastern Canada.111 Due to the sheer size of the
American military system, this problem has the potential to be much
more serious if the random selection method were adopted in the
United States.112
Another problem with the adoption of random selection in the
United States is that a majority of service members are of junior
enlisted rank—meaning they have little military experience.113 Thus,
a panel chosen under a random selection method would statistically
comprise a majority of junior members.114 Such a move would have
significant deleterious effects:
106. Rives, supra note 21, at 226. For instance, judges question and instruct panel membe rs
by stating: “‘You are basically familiar with the military justice system, and you know that the
accused has been charged, her charges have been forwarded to the convening authority and referred to trail. None of this warrants any inference of guilt. Can each of you follow this instruction and not infer that the accused is guilty of anything merely because the charges have been
referred to trail?” U.S.DEP’T OF ARMY, PAM. 27-9, LEGAL SERVICES: MILITARY JUDGES’
BENCHBOOK, ¶ 2-5-1 (1 Apr. 2001).
107. Rives, supra note 21, at 227.
108. UCMJ art. 37 (2005).
109. Rives, supra note 21, at 226.
110. Watkin Interview, supra note 51; Guiora Interview, supra note 79.
111. Behan, supra note 46, at 268.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 255.
114. Id.
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[A] number of venerable and practical military justice customs
[would be discarded]: the tradition that one’s actions will never be
judged by someone junior in rank or experience, the philosophy
that those who judge will be sufficiently acquainted with the principles of good order and discipline to place alleged offenses in their
proper context, and the statutory mandate to assure that those who
serve on courts-martial are best qualified for the duty.115

Moreover, random selection could undermine the unique goals of the
military and its justice system. Random selection reduces efficiency
by increasing administrative burdens and producing delays, and it is
not uniformly operable within all units or under all conditions, such as
during war or contingency operations.116 The withdrawal of selection
power away from the commander infringes on his command ability
because he is no longer able to direct the engagement of his personnel.117 It also frustrates the military justice system by taking away the
commander’s ability to choose a specialized panel based on the needs
of a case.118 Furthermore, it may even lower the collective competency of a panel.119 Additionally, a random selection method would
not live up to its promise to reduce the appearance of unlawful command influence because panel members are still subject to orders, assignments, evaluations, and approval of commanders.120
Use of the random selection method was tried in the U.S. military in the 1970s at Fort Riley, Kansas.121 The method used was not a
pure application of random selection; it disqualified the two lowest
enlisted ranks, used optional questionnaires to create a list of qualified panel members, and after the random selection of the panel
members, the list still passed by the convening authority to receive his
final approval.122 In United States v. Yager, Ft. Riley’s use of a modified random selection process was challenged. 123 The Court of Military Appeals upheld the method with the proviso that the convening
authority must make the final decision that the panel was acceptable
based on Article 25(d)(2) criteria.124 Even approval by the Court of

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 255-56.
Id. at 257, 261.
Behan, supra note 46, at 257.
Id.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 258.
Id.
United States v. Yager, 7 M.J. 171 (C.M.A. 1979).
Id. at 172-73.
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Military Appeals, however, was not enough to begin a movement toward the random selection method.125 Many in the military felt that
the large administrative burden on the Staff Judge Advocate and the
installation personnel offices, which were charged with screening the
questionnaires, was too great.126 In addition, some felt that the panels
failed to meet the “best qualified” criteria.127 The random selection
model used in Yager has since been considered “an anomaly of panel
selection jurisprudence.”128
Finally, Congress has addressed the merits of random selection
versus those of allowing commanders to appoint court-martial members based on subjective criteria. The issue was debated in the late
‘40s and early ‘50s when Congress passed the UCMJ and has since
been revisited, most recently in 1999 in a study by the Joint Services
Committee on Military Justice.129 Congress chose not to include a
random selection method when passing the UCMJ, and the Joint Services Committee report recommended that the current system of discretionary command appointment satisfied the needs of the military
and, therefore, should be maintained.130
B. Independence of Military Judges
Critics of changing the U.S. military justice system also argue
against increasing the independence of military judges.131 One of the
most cogent arguments in their favor is supplied by United States v.
Graf, in which the United States Court of Military Appeals analyzed
the positions taken by the Canadian Supreme Court in the Généreux
case and found them inapplicable in the U.S. system.132 Additional
support for their point of view stems from the requirement that military judges report through a legal chain of command separate from

125. Behan, supra note 46, at 259.
126. See, e.g., id. at 259-61.
127. Id. at 259-61 & n.397. The optional questionnaires created a self-selecting opt out priv ilege by those who chose not to fill them out and return them. Thus, many unbiased and qualified services members who felt that they were too busy with their other important military duties simply chose not to return the questionnaire and thus were not eligible to serve as a panel
member. Id. at 260.
128. Id. at 259.
129. Id. at 195.
130. Behan, supra note 46, at 195-96.
131. See, e.g., Essex, supra note 97.
132. United States v. Graf, 35 M.J. 450, 465-67 (C.M.A. 1992). See discussion infra notes
132-145 and accompanying text.
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that of the convening authority;133 moreover, military judges are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Judge Adv ocate General
(JAG), 134 a disinterested party. As one last safeguard against undue
command influence, the convening authority does not assign individual judges to specific cases or write the judge’s annual performance
report.135
Despite these safeguards, Graf set forth a challenge to military
judicial independence. In Graf, a naval airma n was tried by a general
court-martial for numerous offenses.136 The airman alleged that the
lack of fixed terms for military judges violated the judiciary independence required under the Fifth Amendment.137 In developing its
conclusion, the court looked at the Canadian military system and analyzed the U.S. military justice system under the framework established in Généreux because of the analogous questions raised in both
cases.138 The court decided, however, that consideration of the principles flowing from the Généreux case—removal only for cause, no
convening authority influence over judges’ fitness reports, and the institutional independence of the court139 —did not lead to the same
conclusions within the U.S. system. The court stated that the United
States’ “general courts-martial as presently constituted can be objectively perceived as being independent and impartial, . . .”140 and that
“[i]n reality, the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides substantial independence and protection for military judges, both trial and
appellate, despite their subordinate position in the military hierarchy.”141 Specifically addressing the Canadian court’s concern that
judges only be removable for cause, the court noted that judges are
sufficiently protected by rulings in past cases, which prohibit a judge
from being removed based on his judicial actions.142 Regarding ma-

133. See UCMJ art. 26 (2005) (stating that military judges are directly responsible to the
Judge Advocate General (JAG) or his designee).
134. UCMJ art 6(a) (2005). The U.S. Army, however, has instituted fixed terms for military
judges. Eugene R. Fidell, A World-Wide Perspective on Change in Military Justice, 48 A.F. L.
R EV. 195, 203 (2000).
135. See id. (stating that judges for courts-martial are designated by the JAG, and that the
convening authority does not write the judges’ annual performance reports).
136. Graf, 35 M.J. at 451.
137. Id. at 452.
138. Id. at 465-67.
139. Regina v. Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, 301-05.
140. Graf, 35 M.J. at 466.
141. Id. at 463.
142. Id. at 466.
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nipulation of a judge’s fitness report by a commander, the court
stated that prior rulings in this area have held that neither the JAG
nor another commander can influence the fitness reports based on
their dissatisfaction with the judge’s legal opinion or sentencing.143
Similarly, the court also found that case law protects the institutional
independence of the U.S. military judicial system through holdings
which “protect the military appellate judiciary from untoward interference by the Department of Defense, its Inspector General and the
Judge Advocate General.”144 Overall, the Graf court found the U.S.
military justice system did not suffer from the same shortcomings that
plagued the Canadian system prior to the ruling in the Généreux case
and, thus, held that fixed terms were not mandatory in the U.S. military context since they are only one part of determining judicial independence.145
C. Perceptions and Perceived Bias
Finally, critics of change note that a foreign jurisdiction’s belief
that a perception of unlawful command influence damages its system
of military discipline has no bearing on whether the U.S. system actually suffers from any problem of unlawful command influence.146
Thus, “the better course of action would be to determine whether the
perceptions were accurate, and if not, suggest ways to correct
them.”147 Critics point out that there will always be those who hold a
grudge against the military justice system—no matter how fair the
system actually is in practice.148 Changing the system in order to appease those people would only place the military at the mercy of
these fickle individuals. “A justice system that responds to this sort of
political pressure will not be seen to do justice. Justice is better

143. Id.
144. Id. “We note that a military judge at a court-martial of the United States cannot be
overruled in his judicial decisions by the president of the court-martial, the convening authority,
or his staff judge
advocate.” Id. at 466 n.10.
145. See Graf, 35 M.J. at 466-67 (“In sum, our military justice system and its military judges
are not constituted the same as those considered in the Généreux case.”). See also Weiss v.
United States, 510 U.S. 163, 176-81 (1994) (supporting the legitimacy and independence of military judges in the U.S. military justice system and reit erating the holding from Graf that the lack
of fixed terms of office for military judges does not violate the Due Process Clause).
146. Essex, supra note 97, at 242.
147. Id. at 242.
148. Id. at 241.

06_A LLEMAN.DOC

2006]

ROLE OF THE COMMANDER IN MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEMS

3/1/2006 12:53 PM

187

served in the long run, when incorrect perceptions are cha llenged and
correct information is disseminated.”149
In response to critics who believe that America should take a
more isolationist perspective and disregard alterations made in other
nations, former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor offers
three reasons why the U.S. should consider foreign law: (1) the need
to apply foreign law in domestic courts, (2) the ability to borrow
beneficial ideas, and (3) the enhancement of cross-border cooperation. 150 Justice O’Connor’s second and third points are particularly
valid in the context of this Note. The examination of the practices
and failures of other nations’ military justice systems can lead the
U.S. to the realization that the way its military does things is not the
only way, or even the best way, to accomplish the goals of fairness
and independence in disciplinary proceedings.
Analyzing other military justice systems forces one to engage in a
critical reflection of the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. system.
America has a precedent for looking to persuasive reasoning outside
of its own borders, and it should not disregard this precedent now, especially when reviewing innovations from other constitutional democracies that struggle with similar problems of due process, equal
protection, and the rule of law.151 Former Justice O’Connor concludes: “Our flexibility, our ability to borrow ideas from other legal
systems, is what will enable us to remain a progressive legal system, a
system that is able to cope with a rapidly shrinking world.”152 In light
of joint military efforts in Iraq and the trend toward joint and United
Nations sponsored humanitarian and peacekeeping missions around
the world, global cooperation reinforces the need to take a broader,
international approach in evalua ting the military justice system of the
United States.153
Not only do international perspectives furnish ways of improving
the U.S. military justice system, they also affect how that system is
perceived. Although critics would argue that emphasis should be
placed on the reality of the system and not on perceived bias, “[g]iven

149. Id. at 242.
150. Sandra Day O’Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Judges and Lawyers
Must Learn About Foreign Law, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL OBSERVER, June 1997, at 2-3.
151. See id. at 2 (noting that “it was commonplace for American courts to follow developments in English courts. Even today, first-year students of contract law cut their teeth on English cases like Ha dley v. Baxendale.”).
152. Id. at 3.
153. See Fidell, supra note 134, at 202.
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the extraordinarily delicate situations the military faces around the
world, anything that fosters foreign confidence in the integrity and intellectual rigor of our system eases the task of preserving the primacy
of the United States military jurisdiction over deployed personnel.”154
Perceived bias is a credible concern because public perception,
whether foreign or internal, can force change. For example, the public outcry that arose after the egregious acts by the Canadian military
in Somalia and Bosnia led to an intense focus on the Canadian military justice systems that ultimately resulted in changes.
A similar situation could very easily happen in the United States.
In light of the war in Iraq, operations in Afghanistan, the large numbers of troops being called up for active duty and sent abroad, and the
resultant increased awareness of military issues, any perception that a
proceeding within the military justice system is not independent and
unbiased could lead to an intense public opinion reaction and political
pressure for change. “The appearance argument is a significant one,
because you . . . want to have the confidence of people inside and outside of the military.”155 As noted in the Cox Commission Report, perceptions and potential perceptions of injustices are a “threat to morale and a public relations disaster.”156
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The perception argument, therefore, is a noteworthy justification
for limiting the role of the U.S. military commander in the military
justice context. However, “[t]here is a fundamental anomaly that
vests a commander with life-or-death authority over his troops in
combat but does not trust that same commander to make a sound decision with respect to justice and fairness to the individual.”157 Commanders are in a unique position: they are responsible for military
operations which necessarily require adherence to discipline. To
154. Id. at 202.
155. Major Walter M. Hudson, Two Senior Judges Look Back and Look Ahead: An Interview with Senior Judge Robinson O. Everett and Senior Judge Walter T. Cox, III, 165 MIL. L.
R EV. 42, 86 (2000).
156. See Cox Commission Report, supra note 26, at 3 (referring to a “near-constant parade
of high-profile criminal investigations and courts-martial” and noting that “[a]s a result of the
perceived inability of military law to deal fairly with the alleged crimes of servicemembers, a
cottage industry of grassroots organizations devoted to dismantling the current court-martial
system has appeared, aided by the reach of the worldwide web and driven by the passions of
frustrated servicemembers, their families, and their counsel.”).
157. Behan, supra note 46, at 305 (quoting Generals William Westmoreland and George
Prugh).
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make a commander responsible for maintaining discipline among his
or her troops without giving the commander power and authority
over the military justice system, places the commander at an extreme
disadvantage. Furthermore, an attempt to substantially limit the role
of the commander in the military justice system is at odds with the ultimate objective of maintaining the system’s efficiency and effectiv eness. Commanders are in the best position to know the needs of a
mission, how impacts on a mission can be minimized, and whether a
particular individual can be spared to serve as a panel member.158
Similarly, commanders are privy to private information concerning
the suitability of individual service me mbers to sit on a panel.159
Hence, commanders not only need to play a role in the military justice system, but the military justice system needs the commanders.
It does not logically follow, however, that the need for commanders to play a role requires the commander to play a dominant
role. For the reasons stated above—mission flexibility, discipline responsibility, and knowledge of privileged information – the commander should retain some authority in the military justice system.
The current balance struck with regard to command influence and the
independence of judges, as illustrated by the Graf court, seems to be
particularly appropriate. However, as demonstrated by the systems
in Canada and Israel, reducing the commander’s power to appoint
panel members to courts-martial would not unduly limit the strength
of his control over discipline nor excessively burden the utility of the
military justice system. It would, on the other hand, greatly decrease
the appearance and perception of unlawful command influence.
Although there are many safeguards against a commander’s
unlawful influence on a panel, in some instances, the safeguards are
not very effective. For instance, judicial removal of a panel member
is very difficult to accomplish because the standard set for removal—
that the member “expressed a definite opinion” 160 as to the guilt of
the defendant—is very high. Thus, in some respects, the safeguards
still leave the door open for unlawful command influence. The institution of a random selection method would close the door on the
question of panel independence and bias.

158. Essex, supra note 97, at 249.
159. Id.
160. MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 912(f).
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A modification of the random selection method is recommended
in the Cox Commission Report.161 As stated above, under this form
the convening authority would create a list from which panel me mbers would be randomly chosen.162 Consequently, the convening authority would still select who could serve as panel members; it would
be within his or her discretion to list only the toughest and most partial officers and enlisted service members, or perhaps those deemed
most easily influenced.163
Hence, this method would do very little to decrease bias, perceived or otherwise. To avoid the possibility of continued opportunity for undue command influence, a different version of the random
selection method should be used instead. First, panel members
should be screened using Article 25(d)(2) criteria by a body independent of the convening authority. Next, those who are below the
rank of the accused should be presumptively disqualified. Finally, a
random selection of the remaining qualified candidates should be
conducted, while ensuring that a cross-section of ranks be represented.164 The convening authority should then be given the power to
review the randomly selected panel members to prevent any potential
mission conflicts, but his decision to remove a member from the panel
should be reviewed with great scrutiny. This system would ensure independence, while preserving the custom that an accused is not
judged by a person of a lower rank, guaranteeing that missions are
not compromised, and minimizing any public perception of bias.165
Even if the role of the U.S. commander in the military justice system was exceedingly limited, like that of the Israeli commander, he
would still maintain a sizeable toehold in the military justice system
through the use of administrative corrective measures166 and nonjudicial punishment.167 Most disciplinary problems fall into these catego-

161. Cox Commission Report, supra note 26, at 7.
162. Id.
163. Essex, supra note 97, at 248.
164. In the Canadian Forces, chaplains, legal officers, security officers, witnesses, and officers from the accused’s unit are presumptively disqualified. Behan, supra note 46, at 267-68.
165. A greater administrative burden would naturally ensue, but could be somewhat mitigated by the use of computers. Furthermore, the increased administrative burdens and cost is a
trade -off necessary to attain greater protection of soldiers’ rights and a decrease in actual and
perceived unlawful command influence.
166. MCM, supra note 8, Part V, ¶ 1(g).
167. UCMJ art. 15 (2005); MCM, supra note 8, Part V, ¶ 4.
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ries and, thus, fall outside of the court-martial system. 168 Leaving the
majority of disciplinary matters within the power of commanders recognizes the authority and leadership of the commander and his ultimate responsibility for the discipline of his troops.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the U.S. commander’s role in the military justice
system is distinctive because of his dominant position and control
over many aspects of disciplinary proceedings. Other nations, such as
Canada and Israel, have restricted the role of commanders in their
military justice systems in order to limit actual bias as well as accusations and perceptions of unlawful command influe nce in judicial proceedings. Perception of bias is also a credible concern in the U.S.
military justice system. One method of handling this problem would
be to focus on educating the public about the military justice system
and the safeguards in place to protect fairness. This route would be
particularly satisfactory in the instance of judicial independence, as
explained in Graf. A change in society’s frame of reference would go
a long way to reverse mistaken perceptions.
Regarding the selection of panel members, the justifications for
the commander maintaining control in this area do not outweigh the
rights of the accused and society’s need to not only know, but to perceive that the selection process is fair. “The procedures for disciplining the military forces of a nation are a direct reflection of the society
that the forces were created to pr otect.”169 A random selection method
for panel members, similar to the process in Canada and Israel, but
modified to meet the particular needs of the United States military,
would balance the American public’s fairness concerns with the need
for the commander to maintain some authority and control over the
discipline of his soldiers.

168. Shanor, supra note 20, at 103. The same is true in Canada, where most disciplinary
matters are handled in Summary Tribunals, the equivalent of a U.S. Article 15 administrative
punishment. Watkin, supra note 51.
169. Pitzul, supra note 48, at 1, quoting R.A. McDonald, The Trail of Discipline: The Historical Roots of Canadian Military Law, 1 C.F. JAG J. 1, 1 (1985).

